Hark! A mild kerfuffle has commenced in the libertarian thought-o-sphere over an article by a blogger Cathy Reisenwitz, wherein she argues that persuasion and ostracization (in the form of slut-shaming) is a form of soft coercion or aggression. She essentially states this is so because the shamee has never signed any kind of contract granting permission for the shamer to do what they do.
Lots of people balked at this, stating that the way the term “coercion” is framed, it allows for anything to be deemed coercion. Why, according to this logic, this would justify the shamee to respond to the shamer with force! This is clearly nutzoid, right? But her view is entirely correct, as well as the fact that any kind of action can indeed be deemed coercion/aggression, without contradiction.
In order to understand why this is the case, one needs to realize that both freedom* and force** exist irregardless of the pre-held notion of objective property rights, an ethical perspective rooted largely in the theories of John Locke (and deeply elaborated on centuries later by Murray Rothbard. They are not and cannot be defined in the context of property theory.
There is a grave fallacy that many libertarians – particularly those basing their views mostly on ethical bases – commit constantly, in that these two terms end up getting transformed in the context of their ethics. Thus, force becomes “coercion” or “aggression”. Freedom to do X becomes “liberty”. While at the same time, the freedom to do “Y”, for some reason, “isn’t really liberty” (this is a core contention between statists, anarcho-capitalists, and social anarchists). All of this, every speck of this, is rooted in the theory of objective property rights. Without it, this whole semantics-driven word substitution collapses like a house on sand.
An example of this: a tax is levied against Individual A, who gains her/his wealth through production and sale of goods. The tax is deemed coercion precisely because the force threatened in order to collect the tax is unjust according to the objective property rights theory. If someone, on the other hand, rings up $500 in credit card debt and refuses to pay the card company, they are considered the aggressor because the credit card company is deemed just in its possession of assets that enable it to lend.
Yet both parties in both situations are committing force, and thus, can both be argued to be aggressors. The tax levier is threatening force if the taxpayer does not pay up, yet it can be argued that the taxpayer is violating the property of the tax-levying organization. The debtor is an aggressor against the property of the card company, yet the card company will surely call police (public or private) if the debtor refuses to ultimately pay.
All of this is relevant because concepts of liberty cannot be kept solely within the sphere of property without severe and irreconcilable logical contradictions. “Thick libertarianism” is one example of recent intellectual developments identifying libertarian focus beyond propertarian considerations. It can (but does not have to) include: sex-positivity, gay pride, horizontal organization of firms, cognitive liberty, and yes, even promoting conscious awareness of slut-shaming, etc.
In regards to the core content of the piece, it is important to understand just how slut-shaming affects women and can end up resulting in a myriad of other undesirables – look no further than the recent rash of suicides of teenage rape victims. It is also very interesting that Cathy notes that she “didn’t sign a contract with slut-shamers any more than [she] did with [her] government”, because this remains a core classical-anarchist critique of capitalism – namely, that although trade is undertaken by individuals agreeing to exchange goods/services, no one ever directly “voluntarily” chooses to live under a capitalistic social organization.
All forms of force are equally arguable as aggression, because force only becomes “aggression” once someone ties an objective ethical perspective to property. Contrary to myth, there is nothing objective about any of these ethical perspectives, which tend to turn force and liberty into issues of semantics and dogma over reason and progress. An understanding of this makes Cathy’s piece instantly understandable and valid.
*defined as the ability to undertake X action
**defined as the undertaking of, or threat of, violence against a person or object
thesubjectivistblog 
Once again, this whole “criticism is aggression” argument holds no weight logically.
By your own theory, you are committing aggression right now by criticizing the views of others. You can’t simultaneously lambaste others without being guilty of the same alleged crime. Thus begins a downward, degenerative cycle where no one can say anything that isn’t absolutely praising.
Also, the fundamental difference between taxation and debt accumulation is the latter is voluntary while the former is not. Not recognizing this crucial difference leads to all sorts of whacked-out conclusions.
“By your own theory, you are committing aggression right now by criticizing the views of others. You can’t simultaneously lambaste others without being guilty of the same alleged crime. Thus begins a downward, degenerative cycle where no one can say anything that isn’t absolutely praising.”
It isn’t a degenerative cycle if you don’t believe in an objective ethical theory, because if I don’t believe in such a thing, then I don’t believe there’s any perspective right, or duty, to retaliate or whatever, or where they “can’t do X”. Or Y. No downward spiral, although it’s true that logically there would be if you subscribe to that
Voluntary is important, but it’s a broad term. Property is certainly authoritarian if you believe in socialism, but it’s voluntary in other ways.
Also, we do not live in a free market. What if people have to take on credit card debt to make ends meet in our corporatist system? Surely there’s personal responsibility in any situation, but no one can truly say that’s voluntary, which is vulgar —
There’s a wonderful opportunity now for people to select the norms and mores that they wish to abide by. The “vergesellschaftung” (urbanization) of society means that people can choose their reference groups. Virtually all of us agree on sanctioning murder negatively, but many norms stem from what I think is the illegitimate control of sexuality (which casts an overarching pall of shame over a lot of sexually-unconnected behavior.) It seems to me too that situation ethics is a likely winner for libertarians too, since it allows for the appropriate choice of responses in a given situation.
Definitely, I agree. I’m not familiar with situation ethics but a quick look at it — it looks like fairly ad hoc ethical analyses. It would be hard to predict how a free(er) society would frame such decisions but I’m sure that would be part of it in some way
“An understanding of this makes Cathy’s piece instantly understandable and valid. ”
If objective ethics are a myth then what does it mean to say that shaming is unjustifiable?
Because it’s unjustifiable if only someone decides it so.
If someone chooses that it is something they oppose, it is automatically unjustifiable – to them. No ethics are required for that.
Good for you for trying to look beyond propertarianism. The modern libertarian’s obsession with defining everything in terms of property is a problem. Unfortunately, even as you reject propertarianism you make the same mistake in saying that we cannot define aggression without property. We do not need to involve property in any way to easily define aggression- propertarianism works to confuse what is actually aggressive, as in your example about the tax payer All aggression is about real, actual physical harm against a human being, and coercion is threats of actual physical harm. Propertarians try to define theft as “retroactive slavery”, even though there is no actual harm or threats of harm involved. This “slut shaming” argument commits the same fallacy.
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